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Abstract This article considers Baruch Spinoza’s contribution to a theory of con-
stituent power. Modern theories of constituent power generally agree on its paradoxical
essence: a power that comes before the law and founds the law is at the same time a power
that, once the juridical sphere is established, has to be obliterated by the law. Spinoza’s
ontology has been recognised as one of the early modern sources of constituent power, yet
he argues for a strict equivalence between law and power. This article argues that by
reading Spinoza’s political theory through the lens of a radical immanence between
ontology and history, we can understand him as a source for a theory of constituent
power. It also argues that, through this immanence, Spinoza’s thought offers a solution to
the paradox of constituent power and enriches contemporary discussions on the origin of
juridical sphere and the relationship between politics and law.
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Since the foundation of early modern sovereignty, juridical science has tackled the
problem of establishing a solid ground for authority. However, far from ﬁnding a
stable solution, the problem has become more serious during the centuries of
bourgeois revolutions, when new forms of power took the place of older ones and
the search for a new foundation began in the nature and attributes of the new
revolutionary subjects. This problem has gradually assumed a deﬁnite legal form and
has taken the name of ‘constituent power’. By constituent power, modern juridical
science means the factual and political power that establishes a new legal order,
assigning to it validity and efﬁcacy. The constituent power is therefore pre-ordered
and super-ordered vis-à-vis the constituted power: it founds and precedes the
establishment of law.
Modern scholars who, especially after World War II, have developed this
concept, highlight the ambiguous (Böckenförde, 1991), extreme (Schmitt, 2008)
and seemingly contradictory (Mortati, 1972) character of constituent power.
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According to these authors, in fact, constituent power makes the foundation of law
problematic because it makes the unresolved tension between the factual and
political moment on one side and the normative and legal moment on the other
visible. The origin and foundation of constituted power is in the constituent power
and yet, by deﬁnition, the former obliterates the latter within the legal sphere in
which it establishes itself as the only valid and recognised source of authority. To
be recognised as the sole source of authority, constituted power must necessarily
eliminate any other form of power.
The paradox, then, concerns the origin of the legal sphere and the relationship
between the constituent and constituted moments. Positive law needs an extra-legal
and normative power for its foundation. However, this source is factual and political
and has no other force than the force with which it has established itself over and
against the constituted power that historically precedes it and that it has destroyed,
possibly with violence. In addition, once established and recognised, positive law
cannot tolerate the existence of its source because it must remain the sole source of
legitimacy: the creature must therefore necessarily kill its creator. Yet where does it
ﬁnd the necessary force to accomplish this parricide?
It is indeed a problem of force. Or, to phrase it better, a problem concerning the
complex and multifarious phenomenology of force and its re-appearance in a domain
which it was supposed to be expunged from, sublimated into or replaced by other
mechanisms of interaction among individuals or groups. In the constitutional
framework, these mechanisms are articulated within the law, and yet they constantly
tend to question the law, to disrupt it and ultimately to confront it in a dynamic that
threatens to re-open the initial wound of politics, and sometimes actually does so,
especially in our plural and globalised world, at various degrees of intensity: dispute,
conﬂict, rebellion, insurrection, revolution.
It is thus understandable that one of the major concerns of contemporary political
theory has been to offer a fresh reading of this ancient problem, namely the (re-)
emergence, within politics, of the conﬂictual other from which politics itself
originated, through a deep renewal of the reﬂection on constituent power. I am
interested in particular in three different strategies that scholars have pursued in
recent years: the clariﬁcation of the conceptual paradoxes of constituent power itself,
the redeﬁnition of the people as political actor with factual and juridical prerogatives,
and, ﬁnally, the re-invigoration of the concept of democracy, in particular through the
idea of ‘agonistic democracy’.
Pursuing the ﬁrst strategy, Colón-Ríos has recently undertaken an explanatory
analysis of constituent power, breaking down its theoretical deﬁnition into no less
than ﬁve different meanings and concepts (Colón-Ríos, 2012; see also Colón-Ríos,
2014). Together, these ﬁve meanings highlight the dynamic between, on the one
hand, the constituent power’s institutionalisation into a particular political subject,
and the contrary force exerted against this same subject, under the pressure of new
social forces, on the other. Colón-Ríos’s taxonomy sees constituent power ﬁrst and
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foremost as a ‘transformative impulse’ that increases the subjects’ political power, as
an intrinsically destabilising element. The same taxonomy, however, tends to be too
inclusive, and suggests that every power, including parliamentary sovereignty or the
right to instruct representatives, somehow prolongs the constituent moment into the
sphere of ordinary politics, thus losing sight of what is radically peculiar and
paradoxical in the idea of constituent power itself.
Martin Loughlin underlines this paradoxical nature as the key feature of constituent
power. Like Colón-Ríos, Loughlin reads constituent power as a living force that goes
beyond the founding moment of the juridical community; he emphasises the always
provisional quality of the legal and political domain (Loughlin and Walker, 2007; see
also Loughlin, 2014). Loughlin’s claim is that constituent power can be revitalised as a
political tool by framing it in a relationalist approach, as distinct from the two main
juridical traditions that had previously appropriated the concept, namely legal
normativism à la Kelsen and legal decisionism à la Schmitt. In the attempt to avoid
an excessively radical conception of politics and following Hermann Heller’s legal
philosophy, however, Loughlin’s relationalism grants space for conﬂict only as a
common foundation for discussion among political contenders, based on fair play, thus
overlooking the main problem that Machiavelli and Spinoza had already pointed out at
the dawn of modernity, namely that of tolerating radical, substantial and ultimately
intolerable conﬂicts (Del Lucchese, 2014a).
The weakness of legal normativism in the face of the radical challenges to
contemporary political life has been widely recognised, not only through a sound
elucidation of Kelsen normativism, but also through solid criticism of more recent
neo-Kantian approaches. Decisionism, however, is recognised as an ineliminable
feature of constituent power, through the logic of a founding dimension, seen, for
example, in the work of Andreas Kalyvas. Kalyvas (2005) maintains that constituent
power is the radical truth of modern democracy, a truth that unveils the ideal of
popular self-government beyond and against the paradigm of State sovereignty. Only
by virtue of the collective dimension of the foundation can one distinguish a
legitimate constitution from an illegitimate imposition of might that has been
disguised as right. Eclectically echoing Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt, Kalyvas’s
approach functions mainly as an extrinsic tool of judgment of the legitimacy of
constitutional frameworks. Constituent power becomes not only the ‘radical truth’,
but also the radical origin of the people’s foundation, but this, however, leaves
unquestioned the political ontology of the people itself: what is a people? Who are
the people? What is the nature of the conﬂicts that traverse the people and constantly
redeﬁne its unity?
The concept of the people has been scrutinised more recently by Frank, who
underlines its twofold and ambiguous status, as both a ground of and at the same time
a threat to the political (Frank, 2010, p. 7), as a subject that transcends politics, but
whose origin is by deﬁnition immanent (Frank, 2010, p. 9). Through a critique of
both conservative and liberal readings, Frank claims that neither the constituent nor
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the constituted dimension of the people can or should obliterate its fundamental
ambiguity. Such an ambiguity reveals itself throughout history in theory, and often
against theory itself, as, for example, Hannah Arendt’s inaccurate reading of the
American revolution reveals.
I ﬁnd Frank’s claim about the necessity to reintroduce history (as well as other
cultural ﬁelds such as literature) into theory not only important, but also essential to
avoid the schematisations and shortcuts that political theorists often indulge in. At the
same time, I am not convinced, as Frank suggests, that the modern history of
constitutional moments begins in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, in
particular with the American Revolution and constitutional history. I will show in
this article that the seventeenth century’s political, philosophical and legal debates
cast their shadow upon political modernity in the west. From within, but largely
against, this modernity, Spinoza in particular already speaks of and addresses many
of the concerns that the early constitutional history of the United States, as well as of
revolutionary France, will eventually make visible in legal theory.
The dialectic between history and theory is also at the heart of Näsström’s (2007)
analysis of the people’s legitimacy in the age of globalisation. Against a substantia-
lisation of the demos as a pre-condition of democracy, Näsström claims that the
people is and should be subject to a process of legitimisation as much as its ‘others’
are. The people does not pre-date the space of politics from which it is, alone, entitled
to include or exclude individuals or groups with their own claims and demands. Only
in this way, Näsström maintains, can theory help us avoid the pure factuality of
history, which it does by keeping open a normative dimension that functions as a
regulatory mechanism for a fairer deﬁnition of democracy.
Without questioning the legitimacy of the people, its decision regarding the inclusion/
exclusion of other individuals and groups claims the character of absolute justice. Yet
this character is only historically grounded, and it springs out of the contingencies of
history. For Näsström, only a normative theory can give the people the legitimacy to
make these decisions while at the same time keeping its deﬁnition, status and boundaries
open to otherness, to other subjects and their demands. Näsström’s theory seems
to adhere to a principle of unconditional openness with which she trumps every attempt
to use closure as a constitutive element of legitimacy. However, Näsström is obliged to
recognise a non-negotiable principle that precedes every process of (re-) deﬁnition of the
people’s boundaries. This is the ‘principle of consent that the disagreement on the
constitution of the people has productive force’ (Näsström, p. 627), to which every
political actor must adhere. The horizontal character of democracy as a process
depending on the openness of the people is thus weakened by the necessity of admitting
a vertical principle that guides the process itself from above. Paradoxically, the principle
of unconditional openness of democracy as a process must be closed, so as to be saved
by democracy itself.
The question of democratic openness also drives Keenan’s (2003) analysis. In an
age in which the original force of democracy is ruled out by the force of the market
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under the homogenising umbrella of the dominant Western ideologies, it is more than
ever necessary to recover the meaning of politics as a fully open space: one in which
not only political decisions are taken by the people, but in which the people’s status is
also incessantly questioned by the actual practices of democracy. Like Näsström,
Keenan is committed to a principle of openness as a promise of fairness and justice
within a progressive concept of democracy. As with Näsström, though, such a
promise becomes a premise, namely a guiding principle outside of which there is no
democracy and not even politics at all: echoing (without quoting) the seventeenth-
century legal language and the seventeenth-century critics of Spinoza, Keenan argues
that the people is legitimate only when it places the common good at the heart of
politics; or, otherwise, it is nothing more than a multitude of individuals.
The most elaborate attempt, in recent years, to tackle the issue of the conﬂictual
origin and nature of politics has been developed by the theorists who advocate a form
of radical or agonistic democracy in our pluralist societies. Although not always
synonymous, radical and agonist democracy have tried to challenge the mainstream
liberal political theory, in particular in the deliberative, dialogical and consensual
versions, largely associated with Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls and Seyla Benhabib.
Honig (2009), for example, has developed this critique through the idea of
emergency politics. The foundation of this idea is her critique of post-Kantian
deliberative theories of a rational and discursive construction of the political
community as a space puriﬁed by the contingencies that continually disrupt political
order (Honig, 1993). Honig has challenged the conclusion that the people, as the
main subject of democracy, is either one, coherently united and consistently uniﬁed,
or a multitude, a scattered mass of individuals. Honig unfolds her agonistic
perspective via a valorisation of contention as a positive and generative resource for
politics.
The paradox of democracy is in fact represented, for Honig (2009), by the essential
undecidability of the people, both in terms of its character and its boundaries. This
character of undecidability of the people has consequences that characterise not only
the initial moment of political foundation, but also the entirety of political. This is
among Honig’s most original moves, but it is also Spinoza’s move, as I will show in
my article. What Honig calls the paradox of politics has already been tackled by
Spinoza when he thinks politics as the never-ending process of auto-organisation of
the multitude against the Hobbesian idea of the people.
Drawing eclectically on authors including Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Arendt,
Honig’s theory parallels Chantal Mouffe’s inﬂuential theory of agonist democracy
(see in particular Mouffe, 2000, 2013). Mouffe also speaks about a fundamental
‘paradox’, namely the impossibility of perfectly reconciling different logics that
must however be reconciled and articulated in liberal democracies. What must be
recognised, for Mouffe, is that democracy is ﬁrst and foremost a place of and for
conﬂict, a place that derives from, and incessantly produces conﬂictuality. Far from
making an anarchist reading of political life, however, Mouffe claims that
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distinctions must be made between different kinds of conﬂicts, namely those that
must be expunged and those that can and actually should be admitted within a
pluralist, liberal, democratic society. Agonism should thus be distinguished from
antagonism, with the former a moderate and acceptable form of pluralism, and the
latter the degenerative and destructive element of politics.
Mouffe echoes here the arguments developed by early modern liberal philosophers
engaged in justifying a framework for distinguishing good from bad conﬂicts,
separating more moderate and less violent conﬂicts that can support the common
understanding of political and economic actors from the more radical and violent
conﬂicts that destroy the unity of the people. Machiavelli had already shown the
aristocratic nature of this logic, denouncing as ideological the claim for a political
reason that legitimises such a distinction (Del Lucchese, 2009b; see also McCormick,
2011). Apparently, Mouffe does not see any problem in applying this logic of
partage to distinguish good and bad conﬂicts, nor does she say much about who
would be authorised to create this discourse of power that produces entitlement or
esclusion (see Rancière, 2004).
Mouffe’s critique of the deliberative approach, which is exclusively based on
reason and dialogue, raises the fundamental question of politics as conﬂict. However,
she explicitly claims that the distinction between agonism and antagonism should be
grounded on a prior process of legitimisation, or construction of the ‘legitimate
enemy’. Similarly to Loughlin’s relational perspective, this does not look all that
different from a weak version of the deliberative approach itself, insofar as it requires
a pre-emptive agreement with our adversary, ‘one with whom we have some
common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles
of liberal democracy’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 102). Wenman has attempted to strenghten
this approach by emphasising the constitutive dimension of agonistic practices
(Wenman, 2003, 2013; see also Connolly, 2002, 2005). By doing so, he also
challenges the idea of an absolute freedom of citizens to ‘alter’ the game’s rules, and
therefore the necessity to frame this freedom wtihin a constitution. This, however,
corresponds once again to the attempt to preserve or save constituent power from
itself, a position Spinoza dismisses as unrealistic.
From the point of view of political realism, these positions sound more utopian
than democratic, and sometimes more mystical than theoretical, as when Mouffe
(2000) speaks about democracy as the ‘asymptotic approach… to the regulative idea
of a free unconstrained communication …, as a good that exists as a good only as
long as it cannot be reached’ (p. 137). What Mouffe loses is precisely the sense that
democracy, within and beyond its inception, namely its constituent moment, is a
kratos exercised by a demos, as I will try to show in this article via Spinoza’s theory
of constituent power. Going back to the early modern authors such as Spinoza who
thematised a radical, realist and conﬂictual idea of constituent power, allows us to
avoid the shortcuts of a hidden idealism presented as a democratic critique of
idealistic and deliberative rationalism.
Spinoza and constituent power
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Although the early modern debate on constituent power develops only in the period
of the French Revolution, some scholars, including Carl Schmitt and, most recently,
Negri (1999), recognise the origin of the concept of constituent power in an earlier
period, and in particular in Baruch Spinoza’s thought. This, however, gives rise to a
second paradox, concerning Spinoza’s thought itself. Spinoza is known to have argued
for a radical equivalence between power and right, according to his well-known
formula jus sive potentia. If the right of each individual, both singular and collective, is
for Spinoza its power, in a relation of co-essentiality, how can constituent power derive
from his thought? How can a power that, by deﬁnition, is pre-ordered and super-
ordered vis-à-vis right ﬁt in Spinoza’s scheme? Is not this anteriority and superiority of
power over right incompatible with the immanence advocated by Spinoza?
My ﬁrst thesis in this article is that Spinoza actually maintains a radical and
original idea of constituent power, an idea that provides a solution for the paradox
implicit in its modern deﬁnition. Spinoza’s concept of jus sive potentia implies a
redeﬁnition of the relationship between factual and normative whereby it is not
possible to imagine a relationship of priority or superiority between constituent
power and constituted power. It is only through a radical immanence that one can
confront the law’s claim to obliterate constituent power. Spinoza’s philosophy allows
to clarify the paradox implicit in the traditional deﬁnition of constituent power.
My second thesis is that Spinoza is able to accomplish this theoretical operation of
fundamental importance at the dawn of modernity only by the originality of his
conceptualisation of the relationship between ontology and history. Interpreters such
as Schmitt and Negri have recognised the presence of Spinoza in the genealogy of
constituent power considering its modern deﬁnition. For this reason, they postulate a
superiority of ontology to history. Such a hypothesis, though, not only does not solve
the paradox of constituent power, but instead drags Spinoza into this paradox. I want
to argue that, on the contrary, the nature of Spinoza’s constituent power depends on
an immanent co-implication of ontology and history.
After having brieﬂy illustrated Schmitt’s and Negri’s interpretations, I will analyse
the relationship between ontology and history in Spinoza in order to clarify his
contribution to a theory of constituent power. I will develop my argument following
three major themes of this theory: the argument of the free will of the constituent
subject, that of the relationship between the factual and political moment on one side
and the normative and legal moment on the other, and ﬁnally that of the role and
status of the conﬂict that precedes, accompanies and exceeds the foundation of the
political community.
History and Ontology
The emergence of the concept of constituent power as an absolute power upon which
the constitutional life of a community is grounded is traditionally linked to the Abbe
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Sieyes’s thought and his book Qu’est-ce que c’est le Tiers État? Such a foundation is
more generally related to the French revolution (Zweig, 1909). Without denying the
fundamental importance of the constitutional debates of the French revolution,
twentieth century’s historiography begins to recognise the role played by Spinoza in
the modern genealogy of constituent power in the early years of the twentieth
century. After Menzel (1929), Schmitt in his 1928 text on the Verfassungslehre
places Spinoza at the heart of the problem concerning the foundation and validity of
the legal constitution (Schmitt, 2008; on Spinoza and Schmitt, see Lauermann and
Heerich, 1991; Walther, 1993, 1994, Castrucci, 1999). It is necessary, Schmitt argues
against the jurists of his time, to distinguish the constitution (Verfassung) from
Constitutional Law (Verfassungsgesetz) (Schmitt, 2008, p. 75ff). The validity of any
law, intended as a normative tool, is based on the decision of a pre-existing political
authority. Schmitt (2008) refers the essence of political authority to a major concept
of Spinoza’s philosophy, namely the conatus, the effort to strive to persevere in being
(p. 76).
It is not the ethical-normative plan, but the factual and existential plan that
underpins the political entity’s ‘right’, and that lives and operates amid other entities
in a network of relationships that potentially – and sometimes actually – are in
conﬂict. The Spinozist in suo esse perseverare is summoned here. ‘Each thing’,
Spinoza writes, ‘insofar as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being’ (E III,
P6).1 Spinoza identiﬁes this effort with the thing’s essence itself, which expresses the
same power of God in a precise and determined way. Hence, this conatus expressing
existence, insofar as it is referred to the political entity, receives its legitimation
directly from the highest existing power, namely divine power, and does not require
the mediation of any ethical and normative human value.
Still in the Verfassungslehre, Schmitt further speciﬁes the analogy between
Spinoza’s concept of power, which plays an archetypal function, and constituent
power itself as a historically concrete and original determination, inaugurated by
Sieyes’s work. The people, according to Schmitt, is the origin of every political
event. It incessantly produces new forms of organisation, but its existence is never
formed: a formative entity that is never deﬁnitively formed. Although this is only
possible, historically, with the political rising of the French people in the actual
conditions of the late eighteenth century, Sieyes’s thought is explicitly reminiscent of
Spinoza (Schmitt, 2008, p. 128).
In his 1921 work on dictatorship, Schmitt had already encountered Spinoza’s
metaphysics. In this book, he builds a distinction between the concept of ‘Commis-
sary Dictatorship’, that is to say a juridical institute subordinated to and for the
maintenance of the existing order, and ‘Sovereign Dictatorship’, a force that, on the
contrary, creates a new right and a new order. The historical novelty is once again
placed by Schmitt in the eighteenth century, with Rousseau and Sièyes. Again,
however, the Spinozist matrix resurfaces and points to a different idea, namely a
deviation from the mechanistic rationalism. Constituent power, as well as its
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metaphysical analogue, that is to say Spinoza’s natura naturans, is not limited to the
sphere of pure rationalism. On the contrary, Schmitt (2014) argues that ‘from the
inﬁnite, incomprehensible abyss (Abgrund) of the force (Macht) of the pouvoir
constituant, new forms emerge incessantly, which it can destroy at any time and in
which its power is never limited for good. It can will arbitrarily. The content of its
willing has always the same legal value like the content of a constitutional deﬁnition’
(pp. 123–124).
Through this mystical language, Schmitt attempts to subtract Spinoza from the arid
rationalism in which he thinks his thought is caught. Spinoza’s philosophy is thus
pushed towards a generative mysticism in which inﬁnite forms arise from an
unfathomable abyss. It is interesting to note that Schmitt reverses here Hegel’s
conclusion, albeit while borrowing Hegelian language. Hegel (1990) also talked
about the ‘abyss’ of substance, an abyss, however, that swallows everything: ‘with
Spinozism everything goes into the abyss but nothing emerges from it’ (p. 122).
Following somehow Schmitt on the ground of the unconditional production,
Antonio Negri also ranges Spinoza at the heart of his reconstruction of constituent
power, though he is careful to avoid a mystical reading. Negri (1999) situates
Spinoza within an alternative and underground current of philosophical thought that
leads from Machiavelli to Marx and, beyond Marx, towards a highly subjectivist
conception of constituent power (p. 1). For Negri (1999), Spinoza’s multitudo is the
absolute subject that most faithfully embodies the concept of constituent power in his
alternative history of Western metaphysics (p. 304). Negri’s absolute is far from
Schmitt’s amorphous morphogenesis. Instead it reminds us of the idea of democracy
as an absolute form of government (omnino absolutum imperium, in Spinoza’s
words).
Without embracing a vitalist or mystic approach à la Schmitt, Negri recognises an
indisputable priority of the ontological dimension vis-à-vis the historical one. He thus
raises democracy to the rank of divinity, albeit an atheist and materialist one:
a divinity that expresses its attributes in the ﬁeld of ontology before that of history
(Negri, 1999, p. 305). The historicity and therefore the tensions, conﬂicts and
limitations that characterise democracy as a historical practice of government are
opposed to the ontological priority of puissance over pouvoir, and of constituent
power over constituted power. As a consequence, the absolute nature of democracy is
not found within the irregular and unsteady dimension of history, in which
constituent power establishes itself against other powers. Democracy is an absolute
form of government, for Negri, insofar as it is a metaphysical principle.
If one accepts the ontological priority suggested by Negri, one cannot escape the
paradox implicit in the relationship between constituent power as a metaphysical
entity and constituted power as a historical and legal entity. Constituted power is
created by and derives from constituent power, and yet, the former necessarily
obliterates the latter within the legal sphere. A similar problem emerges if one
follows the mystical interpretation of Schmitt: the speciﬁc legal form that emerges
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from the abyss constituting all forms must necessarily absorb and subsume the
political power that, through a pure and unconditional decision, has given life to it.
The question ﬁnds a better formulation in terms of the relationship between
constituent principle on one side and constituted power on the other. The historical
dimension has to be envisaged together with the ontological one. In other words,
beyond the ontological purity argued by Schmitt and Negri, it is within the
relationship between ontology and history that the problem of constituent power
must be examined.
Reason and Desire
One of the main features of constituent power that modern theorists emphasise is that
its free will is absolute. The free will expresses the determination to break with the
past and to establish a new order and a new idea of justice. Rousseau, for example,
focuses on the quasi-mystical passage from the will of all to the general will (see Del
Lucchese, 2014b). For Sieyès, the nation itself is deﬁned through a single will. A ﬁrst
major difference from Spinoza’s conception thus emerges from the idea of a free and
absolute will as characteristic of modern constituent power. In fact, one of the major
objectives of Spinoza’s philosophy is to destroy, in both the anthropological as well
as the ontological dimension, the idea of a free will, as well as to denounce the
aberrations arising from it.
To begin with, Spinoza’s God has no free will. Reversing the traditional
personalistic concept of the Judaeo-Christian theology, as well as the common sense
around the idea of freedom, Spinoza’s God only acts by the necessity of its own
nature and, for this reason, it can be said free (E I, 17, C2; see also E I, 17, S). God, in
other words, does not act like a king, as ignorant theologians believe (E II P3S). This
analogy with kingship that Spinoza employs to redeﬁne the idea of God also works in
the other direction, that is, to deny that a king can be conceived through the analogy
with divine omnipotence, or, as Hobbes would put it, like a mortal God. No political
power therefore, including a constituent power, can be recognised as acting
according to an absolutely free will, because to Spinoza such a will is simply an
illusion.
Spinoza’s analysis extends to his conception of man and, in particular, the mind–
body relationship. He accuses Descartes of having inaugurated a revolutionary
method without having been able to forsee all its consequences, and of having
ultimately opted for absurd and incomprehensible assumptions (E V, preface).
Against the Cartesian anthropology, Spinoza argues for the nonexistence of free will
in the human mind (E II, P48), and maintains instead that the will, which is nothing
but the intellect (E II, and P49C S), is not a free but rather a necessitated cause (E I,
P32). This conclusion rules out every possibility of conceiving the relationship
between the mental and the corporeal, the res cogitans and the res extensa, in terms
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of mutual inﬂuence and reciprocal power of one over the other, as it is for Descartes.
The mind and the body, Spinoza argues, are both either active or passive, affecting
and being affected at the same time in the same way.
The constituent power’s absolute freedom is thus as inconceivable as any other
entity’s absolute freedom. Such freedom would establish a relationship between the
constituent subject and the constituted object – the law or the formal constitution –
that would be analogous to the Cartesian model of mind–body relationship: a free
people that, as an absolute subject, freely wants and freely determines what it wants,
imposing a legal form on the matter of social relations. Nothing like that exists in
Spinoza’s philosophy. In the transition from the individual to the collective sphere,
the will does not change its nature: the multitudinis voluntas only appears once in the
Political Treatise and Spinoza does not devote special attention to it, referring it to
the executive rather than the constituent power (PT VII, 25).
Spinoza is thus able to place reason on the same level as affects and oppose the
abstractions of contractualist philosophers. Imagination becomes for him a cement
that is sometimes stronger than reason itself in the process of the state formation
Williams, (2007). Men ‘conspire together either by reason of a common fear or
through desire to avenge a common injury’ (PT III, 9). This is often accompanied by
a metus solitudinis, or fear of loneliness, that pushes men to strive for a political life
in common. Against the chimera of will, therefore, Spinoza opts for a more complex
interweaving between reason and desire. A desire that, despite the myth of unity and
homogeneity, begins to reveal what remains hidden in modern constructions of
constituent power, that is to say, its polemical and conﬂictual dimension.
Before and beyond the Constituent Moment
Modern theorists generally agree that constituent power is released from any legal
obligation. According to Böckenförde (1991), the problem of constituent power’s
limitation cannot be posed in terms of a preceding ‘right’ that opposes it, because
there is nothing legally prior to constituent power. Other limits and other obligations,
however, exist for him: limits that come before and are above the process of law’s
constitution itself, in the sense that they express the tendency towards a legal order
and the constitutionalisation of power. It is precisely the conformity to such ethical
principles and extra-juridical normativity that gives legitimacy, in Böckenförde’s
view, to constituent power. Either constituent power conforms to them, or it is a mere
destructive force with no connection with the juridical.
This perspective, however, does not overcome, but rather conﬁrms the initial
paradox. In fact, it intensiﬁes the conﬂict on both the juridical and the ethical plains.
With regard to the juridical, the paradox appears in the conﬂict between the
constitution, which by deﬁnition is derived and posed (in the sense of a ius positum)
by the legislator, and the values and ethical principles that constituent power means
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to establish (positive law versus ethics). How and when has constituted power been
able to set itself free from the constituent power that is its only origin?
With regard to the second, or ethical, dimension, the paradox is even more serious.
Constituent power entirely unfolds in the ethical dimension. It is therefore by
deﬁnition legitimate in asserting its own values and principles against other values
and principles, with no superior normativity to be consulted (ethics versus ethics). To
what should it therefore comply? Who can judge the superiority of some ethical
principles vis-à-vis other principles, without at the same time revealing – through the
act of judgement itself – the necessarily contingent and therefore historical and
factual nature of any ethical value?
This dilemma can be solved, in my view, via Spinoza’s thought. One of Spinoza’s
major theses is the negation of any higher and transcendent principle that guides
men’s thoughts and actions from above. Those with a traditional conception of God
and religion generally believe in these higher principles. But it is precisely here that
we see the difference between the wise and the ignorant, and, as Deleuze has put it,
between ethics and morality (Deleuze, 1968).
Spinoza begins by attacking the concepts of good and evil. As absolute principles,
they are merely ‘human ﬁctions’. Spinoza replaces them with the concepts of useful
and useless, emphasising their relativity and immanence vis-à-vis the desires,
aversions, actions, and thoughts of individuals whom they refer to (E I, Ap, see
Saar, 2013). Hence, in Spinoza’s thought, there is not any anterior or superior value
or principle that could work as an external and non-juridical boundary to the exercise
of constituent power.
Spinoza’s use of categories such as just (justus) and justice (justitia) also conﬁrms
this reading. Both the noun and the adjective have an astonishingly low frequency in
Spinoza’s lexicon, especially when compared with the imposing presence of the
category of right (jus), understood as power (potentia), in its various meanings (see
Giancotti, 1970). Justice is often conceived by Spinoza as nothing more than an
attitude accompanying charity towards others. In a strictly political and legal sense,
the concept of justice is signiﬁcantly absent where one would expect to ﬁnd it,
namely in the contractualist argument of chapter XVI of the Theological-Political
Treatise. Chapter XVI refers to chapter XIX which, along with other parts of the
Ethics and the Political Treatise, acknowledges the existence of just and unjust only
within the State and thus, for the purpose of our discussion, only downstream from
the exercise of constituent power. A superior idea of justice is therefore not a main
concern for Spinoza. There is no transcendence within his philosophy, not only on
the juridical plain, but also on the ethical one: neither before, during, nor after the
constituent moment can one ﬁnd anterior or superior principles that may guide or
externally limit constituent power.
And yet, as modern scholars have underlined, constituent power lies at the same
time in the factual and in the legal dimensions. To fully grasp this idea, it is useful to
consider the work of Italian jurist Costantino Mortati. Mortati (1972) speaks about a
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‘normative fact’: a paradoxical expression that seems to turn upside-down Hume’s
solution to the is-ought problem by locating the foundation of what legally ought to
be in what factually is, without dismissing the normative dimension of the problem
(p. 12). Implicitly following Spinoza, however, Mortati does not regard his
normative fact as an amphibian concept with one foot in the factual and the other in
the juridical, or as a mediation or a compromise. On the contrary, dissociating
himself from contemporary jurists like Georg Jellinek, Santi Romano or Carré de
Malberg, Mortati (1972) interprets the normative fact in the sense of the autonomy
and, one might say, the esse sui juris, that is to say, ‘a fact which has in itself its own
law and the guarantees of its persistence in the future’ (p. 12).
Mortati’s normative fact is of pivotal importance in grasping constituent power’s
nature as something that is at the same time political and legal. It is through Spinoza,
however, that such an idea becomes fully consistent and avoids the paradox of the
traditional relationship between constituent and constituted power. Constituent
power has in itself its own law, and the multitude that exercises it is free and fully
sui juris insofar as it autonomously establishes those laws: it is sui juris, once again,
not in the sense of a justus, but in the sense of a jus sive potentia (see Balibar, 1985;
Montag, 2005; Morﬁno, 2014).
Spinoza’s deﬁnition of subject and sovereign also conﬁrms this conclusion. The
subject is the individual who obeys, whatever the reasons for this obedience: Non
enim ratio obtemperandi, sed obtemperantia subditum facit (TPT XVII). This
conclusion is mirrored by the other for which oboedientia facit imperantem: a maxim
that is not found in Spinoza, but that was attributed to him much later, and is
regularly quoted as the ground of any imperative theory of law (see Radbruch, 1914;
Preuß, 1921; Heller, 1927; or Jellinek, 1931). This maxim is still at the heart of
modern conceptions of effectiveness and justiﬁcation of constituent power (Mortati,
1972, p. 51). Like any other individual, Spinoza argues, the sovereign exercises his
right to rule only insofar as he also has the power to do so. This is what Matheron
(1984) has called a ‘instantaneous consensus’, distinguished from the ‘integral
consensus’ of Grotius, Hobbes and other classic authors of contractualism. Sovereign
and subject are thus mutually deﬁned, in and through a force relationship, without the
primacy of a principle of authority but rather following the variations in the level of
rationality and usefulness of each given command (Bove, 1996).
Legally, the sovereign holds an absolute right to order whatever he wishes.
Factually, however, such a right does not exceed his actual power, not only in
relation to the agent, but also to the patient, according to the well-known passage
from Political Treatise, IV, 4. The same is true for constituent power. Formally, it is
in a situation of absolute freedom, but from a factual point of view, it acts and
operates in a speciﬁc historical context.
Having in itself its own law and the guarantees, at once factual and juridical, of the
persistence in its own being means having the power, and therefore the right, to act
and operate according to its own nature. Here lies the autonomous character of every
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power, individual and collective. The principle of jus sive potentia, once again,
characterises every single individual, including the sovereign and the constituent
subject. Spinoza reaches the radicality of this position not by undermining the
concept of law, but on the contrary by ‘allowing it to say everything that it is able to
say’ (Matheron, 1984).
‘Jura sunt’, Spinoza writes, ‘anima imperii’ (PT X,9). If a State can be said to be
eternal, it is because its jura remain intact. This passage has challenged our best
translators. Jura has been translated by legislation, laws, constitution, rule of law,
and the rights themselves. Rarely, in Spinoza’s lexicon, have the options been so
divergent. What is Spinoza suggesting when he says that the jura are the anima
imperii? I think that he is applying to the problem of the relationship between politics
and law the same solution through which he thinks the radically immanent relation-
ship between soul and body. The jura does not lead the state from above, and does
not act on the positive law from above, in the same way that the mind does not guide
the body from a superior position.
Vis-à-vis the present discussion, however, I think that one can say something more.
The soul of the imperium is not the constitution, as some translators suggest. It is not
even the emperor himself, as suggested by several classical authors, including
Tacitus (1931, I,12, pp. 266–267), Seneca (1928, I,III,5, pp. 366–367), or Florus
(1929, II,XIV,6 pp. 300–301). My hypothesis is that Spinoza means something very
close to the principles, at the same time factual and normative, legal and political, that
precede, accompany, and go beyond the formation of the state. He means something
similar, in a word, to constituent power: a living power that animates and constitutes
the juridical, on both the factual and the normative ﬁeld:
If any State can be eternal, it must be one whose jura, being once correctly
established, remain inviolate. For the jura are the anima imperii; if they are
preserved, the State is preserved. But the jura cannot stay intact unless they are
defended both by reason and by the common affects of men; otherwise if they
are dependent solely on the support of reason, they are weak and easily
overthrown.
Spinoza raises the question of the adequacy of constituent principles (jura
fundamentalia) to the actual development of political life. The historical case of
dictatorship, recalled by Spinoza in the paragraph that follows the quote above, is
notable. Spinoza emphasises that laws are sometimes destroyed even if they are
protected by reason and the common affects. This happens in particularly critical
situations when the state itself is under the action of external or internal forces that
threaten it. All, then, look for a man ‘renowned for his victories’ to become dictator,
trusting in his exceptional intervention to restore normality (PT X,10). This is
precisely what led to the loss of Roman freedom.
In his analysis of dictatorship, Spinoza is precisely conceptualising constituent
power, as Schmitt also recognises. Through sovereign dictatorship, Schmitt suggests,
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a constituent principle rises from within the constitutional life of the State. This
principle is closely related, following Schmitt’s (1996) famous formulation, to the
deﬁnition of the sovereign as the one who decides in the state of exception.
Spinoza also argues that dictatorship heavily impacts on the question of
sovereignty. His conclusion, however, is opposed to Schmitt’s, because for Spinoza
the juridical institute of dictatorship inevitably destabilises the constitutional order
currently in place. A state tendentially eternal, on the contrary, is for Spinoza the one
in which constituent power remains alive, without transcendentally guiding the State,
but rather on a plane of immanence and coexistence with it.
Such a solution, however, prevents a peaceful relationship between the constituent
and constituted moments. On this plane of immanence, the same exceptional and
conﬂictual historical situation that opened the constituent period moves, so to speak,
within the juridical and imposes a new role for the phenomenon of conﬂict, both
externally, vis-à-vis other states, and internally, between the multitude and the
sovereign.
Conﬂict against Power and Conﬂict for Power
In the dialectic between the factual and the normative, modern interpreters have
questioned the possibility of developing a theory of constituent power, given
the multiplicity of historical situations upon which the concept is grounded.
If constituent power, Mortati (1972) asks, is the expression of a supreme will, if it is
pure factuality, and hence subject to virtually endless variations, how can one
develop a scientiﬁc study of it? Mortati suggests the need for a study of constituent
power at the same time historical and theoretical, in order to grasp its ‘necessary and
therefore constant forms’, but also its ‘concrete singular realisations’ and ‘historical
typologies’.
But Spinoza, for whom the ontological level is never separable or separated from
the historical one, had already made such a study. With his own historical situation in
mind, namely the conﬂict between the United Provinces and Louis XIV’s France,
Spinoza analyses the problem of constituent power through two concrete examples.
Each situation has its own characteristics from which, however, it is possible to draw
general conclusions.
The ﬁrst historical case is the story of the exodus and the liberation of the Hebrews
by Moses. Spinoza introduces the unique history of this nation with an explicit
reference to two alternative conceptions of constituent power, which will be
eventually developed during and after the French revolution. Traditionally, the
ground of sovereign authority, absolute because unfounded and thus entirely
independent, was divine authority. This is why it has been maintained that the origin
of constituent power is to be found in the secularisation of theological attributes and
divine authority. Spinoza, on the contrary, shows that divine authority is nothing
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more than an imposture employed by sovereigns to stabilise their regimes. They have
always tried to make people believe that majesty ‘is established by God, not by the
votes and consent of men, and is preserved and sustained by God’s special
providence and help’ (TPT XVII). For Spinoza, the ground of constituent power’s
authority and its attributes are to be found in the entirely human history, unique and
yet paradigmatic, of the Jewish people.
The characteristic of the Jewish people after the exodus is that they consider civil
law and religion one and the same thing. To God alone, in fact, they have promised to
be faithful and they have fully transferred their power to him, and therefore their
rights, making him their sovereign. It is not the power of the Hebrews that depends on
God, but rather the power – and therefore the right – of God, qua sovereign, that
depends on their decision, after they follow Moses’s advice. They form a ‘theocracy’,
which corresponds in reality, according to Spinoza, to a democracy.
In the beginning, then, all the people went before God, their legitimate sovereign.
However, crushed by his voice and fearing death, they decided to transfer the
exclusive right to interpellate God and interpret his commands to Moses. Spinoza
adds that this is indeed a ‘second pact’, one that abrogates the ﬁrst. Constituent power
is with the people, who confer all their power on Moses, who could have legitimately
used it to transform the theocracy to a monarchy. Instead, after his death, this power
is separated into the administration of public affairs, the division of land and the
attribution of the respective powers to the different tribes. The original relationship
between the people and God remains intact, and God is conﬁrmed as the true
sovereign.
That the question of law (that is to say, of its legitimacy, its authority and its
validity) is always already a matter of fact is demonstrated by experience and reason
(see Moreau, 1994). It is shown ﬁrst, for Spinoza, by the crucial dimension of the
armed Jewish people, which is the true foundation of their liberty and resistance to
corruption. No other organisation, institution or custom is so powerful as the army in
keeping the Hebrews attached to their traditions and freedom. Following Ezra, and
using a dazzling expression, Spinoza calls Jerusalem a civitas rebellis, a rebel city
(TPT XVII). Jerusalem did not and does not recognise any superior force. It is
therefore not, strictly speaking, a return to war, but rather an intrinsic link that law
maintains with war, or rather that the Hebrews maintain with their original power,
that is, their constituent and factual power. This is essentially a warlike power, in the
double sense of being in conﬂict against anyone else, and being defended by force
and by the free citizens’ army.
In the last part of the chapter, Spinoza explains the causes of the collapse of the
Jewish State, through the introduction of the Levites’ privilege. The original
democratic theocracy is corrupted by the introduction of an element of privilege that
takes the place of the original equality. Thus the new constituted power clashes with
the constituent power from which it was generated. Constituent and constituted
power diverge and corruption gradually weakens the State’s original strength.
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When the original popular government is transformed into a monarchy, which is not
suitable for the people’s ingenium, everything collapses (TPT XVIII).
The second historical example, as complex as the ﬁrst one, is that of the
Aragonians, illustrated in Political Treatise VII,30. Spinoza’s main source is Perez
(1644), former secretary of Philip II. Closely following his source, Spinoza speaks of
the birth of the legendary fueros aragonenses, the privileges of the Aragonians vis-à-
vis the King of Spain (Magoni, 2007). After the expulsion of the Moors, the
Aragonians found themselves in a situation quite similar to that of the Jews after the
exodus. They decided to create a king and seek the advice of Pope Gregory VII. The
Pope suggests that they follow the example of the Hebrews, who had avoided
creating a monarchy. But, he adds, if they really want a monarchy, it should at least
be constituted with certain conditions. Thus the Aragonians establish a council, led
by the Justicia. Randomly appointed (the ultimate democratic mechanism), the
council had the right to oppose the sentence of any court, and even of the king
himself. It is thus a real counter-power, whose authority derives directly from the
constituent power of the Aragonese people.
This council’s highest authority was the power to appoint and depose the king,
according to the apocryphal formula ‘Nos qui valemos tanto come vos, y podemos
mas que vos, vos elegimos rey’ (Being as praiseworthy as you are, and more
powerful than you, we appoint you king). And it is precisely with the abolition of this
absolute power that the gradual normalisation of the Aragonese anomaly begins.
After the initial conﬂict with Pedro IV in the mid-fourteenth century, the people’s
privileges will progressively be abolished under Ferdinand of Aragon, Philip II and,
ﬁnally, Philip III, under whose reign the Aragonians retain ‘nothing but the plausible
names and empty forms of freedom’ (PT VII, 30). Again, as for the Jews, Spinoza
tells the story of a constituent power that is gradually absorbed and expropriated
within a constitution that separates the subjects from their own natural power.
However, the story of the ﬁrst conﬂict between the subjects enjoying the fueros
aragonenses and King Pedro IV reveals the precariousness that characterises any
new legal construction. King Pedro, in Perez’s account, stages the solemn destruction
of the document establishing the privileges. He cuts the document with a knife,
hurting at the same time his hand, to indicate that only by shedding blood may a king
be subject to a people. The fueros are thus eliminated, provided, Spinoza adds, that
subjects could ‘take up arms against any violent action whereby anyone may seek to
encroach on their dominion to their hurt, yea, even against the king himself and the
prince, his heir, if he thus encroaches (on their dominion)’ (PT VII, 30).
This is a meagre condition, one could say, for those who have just lost their
privileges. Yet Spinoza adds here a reference, explicit and direct, to the jus belli, the
law of war that always exists between subjects and sovereign. ‘As we have shown in
Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter IV’, he says, ‘it is not by civil right but by right of war
that a king can be deprived of his power to rule; in other words, it is by force alone
that his subjects may resist his force’ (PT VII, 30). Conﬂict comes to the foreground
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once again, as the underlying dimension of any relationship of domination and any
conﬁguration of balance between constituent power and constituted power, accord-
ing to the principle that Spinoza uses to govern the whole argument, namely the strict
equivalence between jus and potentia.
Through these two historical examples, Spinoza evokes a third, possibly more
complicated and certainly more urgent situation, that is, the Low Countries of his
own time. Zourabichvili (2002) highlighted the similarity between the Aragonese
regime and the United Provinces during the struggle between the Regents and the
Count, before the Orangist triumph in 1672. Spinoza wrote the Political Treatise in a
country under occupation, trying to identify the conditions for a resistance and an
ultimate effort to defend liberty. It is only through a struggle for freedom that the
multitudo will be able to reopen the constituent process. In line with the historical
examples cited, however, Spinoza also develops the argument he learned from the
acutissimus Machiavelli, namely that the external conﬂict is always also an internal
conﬂict. The free multitude tends towards the most stable and absolute regime,
namely democracy, by ﬁghting against the privileges of a group (as the Hebrews
against the Levites) or a single individual (as the Aragonese people against the king
Pedro IV).
Only in this way, that is, through history, Spinoza is able to build an ontology of
constituent power. On this basis, Spinoza develops a critical analysis of the
traditional forms of government, and strongly maintains his opinion of the superiority
of democracy as the only absolutely absolute imperium. Only in democracy is the
highest level of collective power – and therefore right – attained, because ‘the greater
the number of men who thus unite in one body, the more right they will all
collectively possess’ (PT II, 15 and PT II, 13; see Sharp, 2007, 2011).
The question of monarchy and aristocracy is, however, more complex. The
problem becomes, for Spinoza, the relationship between the multitude’s constituent
power and the constituted form of government. In both monarchy and aristocracy,
Spinoza identiﬁes a constitutive right of resistance that continually generates a
conﬂict between the multitude and the sovereign (see Bove, 2002; Del Lucchese,
2009a).
A monarchy, to begin with, is never really that, because one man cannot support
the entire weight of the State. The monarchy is always in fact a hidden aristocracy.
The sovereign’s right to command the subjects is here based on his power to do so, as
it is the case for any individual that commands to any other individual, singular or
collective, in Spinoza’s universe. While the subjects fear and respect him, the
sovereign has the right to govern, for he has full power to do so. Once fear and
respect disappear, wiped away by indignation, his right collapses, because his power
vanishes. The rules do not depend on public law, but on natural law, because they can
only be guaranteed by a right to war (PT IV, 5).
The aristocracy seems to be a more stable form of government, because
sovereignty lies in a collective body, and is thus immune to the oscillations of a
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mortal being. In praxi, however, the systematic exclusion of the multitude from
government creates the conditions for a latent and constant conﬂict against the
sovereign. This form of government is not absolute because ‘the multitude is an
object of fear to the rulers, thereby maintaining some degree of freedom for itself,
which it asserts and preserves, not by express law, but by tacit understanding’ (PT
VIII, 4). Jus multitudinis against jus imperii.
A twofold conﬂict, then, appears in Spinoza’s theory: conﬂict against power, and
conﬂict for power, when power is not democratically organised and equally shared.
Positioning Spinoza in line with Hobbes and Bodin and within the State sovereign
paradigm, as, for example, Kalyvas (2005) does, is in this sense a serious mistake.
Moreover, it encourages the dubious reading of constituent power as a homogeneis-
ing and fundamentally centripetal force. Kalyvas goes so far as inventing a doubtful
etymology for constituent power: the preﬁx con-, he says, refers to the Latin cum-,
with the meaning of being with, being together. Thus, for him, ‘the word constituere
… literally denotes the act of founding together, founding in concert, or creating
jointly’ and ‘the constituent power points at the collective, intersubjective… attribute
of sovereignity, at its cooperative, public dimension’ (Kalyvas, 2005, pp. 235–236).
I have not been able to ﬁnd any support for Kalyvas’s etymological interpretation.
The com- of constituere is in fact an intensive preﬁx that reinforces the idea of setting
up, ﬁxing, and establishing things together (see TLL, 1900-1906). ‘Together’ cannot
be taken in a subjective sense, as Kalyvas suggests (that is, different subjects acting
together, in concert or jointly), but only in an objective sense (that is, a subject that
organises, constitutes and puts together different objects).
The idea of conﬂict, thus, regards the constituent power against the constituted
power but also, and here, concisely, is my thesis, conﬂict within constituent power
itself. Constituent power is based on a structural dissension and, instead of
neutralising it in the juridical, it moves it within the constituted dimension.
Conclusion
Spinoza anticipates one of the fundamental problems of modern constituent power,
namely its reactivation within the law when the material conﬁguration of society no
longer corresponds to its initial project. Spinoza also offers a new perspective on this
problem through his conception of jus sive potentia. For this reason he insists on the
importance of keeping alive the constituent principles, the jura fundamentalia: the
only way to avoid violent revolutions is to maintain a state of permanent revolution,
namely a situation in which the juridical does not detach itself from the factual from
which it arises, but instead gives it life, in and through collaborative and conﬂicting
relationships among subjects.
Mortati’s conclusions, once again, are close to Spinoza’s. Constituent power,
Mortati argues, arises from the disharmony between the different interests frozen in
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the positive law and the existing power relations on the one hand, and what he calls the
inﬁnite process of criticism and desire for more justice on the other. Such a desire
inevitably grows when the old order’s capacity to adapt to a new situation has reached
its limit or, as Spinoza would put it, when fear becomes indignation (PT IV, 6). Thus a
process of adaptation begins, which reveals its partiality and conﬂictuality, and in
which new values and principles – new jura – come forward to establish a
new order.
The validity of these principles is self-grounding, that is to say autonomously
legitimate without the need for any external justiﬁcation. Spinoza had explained this
clearly to Jarig Jelles: ‘I always preserve the natural right in its entirety (naturale Jus
semper sartum tectum conservo)’ (Letter 50). The jura that bind together the factual
and the normative, the constituent and the constituted, are powerful if and only if they
are protected by reason and affects. When modern theorists argue that such principles
are immutable, eternal and super-ordained because they are inspired by reason, they
end hypostasising reason itself. Again, with a strong Spinozist tone, Mortati suggests
instead that these principles are perhaps immutable only for the subject that can fully
grasp the whole rationality of nature, in a comprehensive and universal way. But
such a being is not human; in fact, in a Spinozist sense, it is none other than God.
To both Mortati and Spinoza, therefore, the reference to natural law means
the historical realisation and relativisation of the search for the jura most suitable to
the new order. Constituent power is not, in this sense, an absolute subject or an
absolute power. It is rather a historically determined subject and a power, within the
here and now of material relations of power, those it follows as much as those it is
able to create: against the absolute monarchy in 1789, against fascism in 1945 and so
on. Constituent power can only be seized historically, on the plain of the immanent
relationship between politics and law, as well as between ontology and history.
Following Spinoza, therefore, one cannot postulate the priority and superiority of
constituent power over constituted power, no more than one can postulate the
superiority of potentia over jus, or of substance over modes. Imagining such a
superiority is certainly possible, but only because our imagination is both powerful
and misleading. Constituent power and constituted power are just two aspects of the
same reality.
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Note
1 I have occasionally modiﬁed Shirley’s translation for greater accuracy. I will hereafter use the following
abbreviations to cite Spinoza’s works in the text (Spinoza, 2002): Ethics=E, Theologico-Political
Treatise=TPT, and Political Treatise=PT. All roman numerals refer to parts or chapters. In the case of
the TPT and the PT, numbers refer to paragraphs. When referring to citations in the Ethics, I will not use
page numbers, but instead the following abbreviations to signify the location of quotes: Axiom=A,
Deﬁnition=D, Proposition=P, Scholium=S, Corollary=C, Appendix=Ap, Postulate= Post.
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